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Legal Origins and the Evolution of Institutions:  
Evidence from American State Courts  
Abstract 
Several important studies of institutions assume that the quality of institutions is 
persistent following some formative historic event. The assumption of institutional 
persistence, however, begs the question of how these institutions persisted.  To better 
understand this issue, this paper examines the evolution of state courts in the United 
States. We begin by reviewing the evidence that France, Spain, and Mexico operated 
civil-law legal systems in territory that would later make up thirteen states. One important 
philosophical difference between civil-law and common-law legal systems arises from 
differences in their beliefs regarding the appropriate degree of judicial independence. To 
show how these beliefs, if persistent, would manifest themselves, we present a model in 
which legislatures allocate budgets to their judges. In the model, common and civil-law 
legislatures have different preferences regarding the level of judicial independence. Our 
model predicts civil-law legislatures will give fewer discretionary resources to their 
judges when judicial elections are replaced by a system of appointments. We confirm this 
prediction using state-level data for the period 1961-1999. Finally, we argue that one 
important reason why civil-law preferences for a weak judiciary appear to have persisted 
in the American states is that the political culture within state legislatures is slow-moving. 
   2
1.  Introduction 
There is a growing body of evidence documenting that the quality of institutions that 
protect property rights can explain the large variations in long term growth, financial 
market development, and other important outcomes across countries. Many of these 
studies assume that the quality of institutions does not change very much after some 
formative historic event. Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2001), for example, argue 
that the way in which early settlers of former colonies built institutions that protected 
property rights during the seventeenth, eighteenth and nineteenth centuries was 
formative. La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny (1998), Djankov, La Porta, 
Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer (2002) and La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Pop-Eleches and 
Shleifer (2004) argue that the development of common law and civil law in the Middle 
Ages and the transplantation of these legal codes around the world during the nineteenth 
and early twentieth century was also formative for institutions that affect finance, entry, 
and regulation.
1 
  The assumption of institutional persistence, however, begs the question of how these 
institutions persisted. To better understand the mechanisms through which institutions 
persist, this paper examines the evolution of state courts in the United States during the 
twentieth century. We are interested in state courts because they are responsible for 
evaluating, enforcing and even creating law.
2 American states provide a useful 
laboratory, because they share a common language and many other attributes. Yet they 
are also characterized by diverse geographic, cultural, and, importantly for this paper, 
legal initial conditions.  
                                                 
1 Other relevant studies include Engerman and Sokoloff (2001, 2002), Rodrik, Subramanian and Trebbi 
(2004), and Berkowitz, Pistor and Richard (2003). 
2 For a good overview on evolution of the state courts, see G. Alan Tarr, (1996, 1998).    3
  We begin by reviewing the evidence that France, Spain, and Mexico established and 
operated civil-law legal systems in territories that would later make up thirteen states. 
The remaining thirty-five states in the continental United States were settled by England 
or the United States and always had common law.  All of the civil-law states, with the 
exception of Louisiana, adopted common law around the time they entered the Union.
3 
One important philosophical difference between civil-law and common-law legal systems 
arises from differences in their beliefs regarding the appropriate degree of judicial 
independence. Common-law legal systems prefer more independent judges, and civil-law 
legal systems prefer less independent judges (Merryman 1985).  
  To show how the attitudes in legislatures about judicial independence, if persistent, 
would manifest themselves, we present a model in which common-law and civil-law 
legislatures have different preferences regarding the level of independence of the 
judiciary. The model builds on Maskin and Tirole (2004) and predicts that once judicial 
elections are replaced with appointments, civil-law legislatures will make larger cuts in 
their judges’ discretionary budgets than common-law legislatures. We confirm these 
predictions using data from the period 1961-1999. In a set of falsification exercises, we 
show that the observed effect is attributable to differences in historic legal systems and 
not to historic differences associated with slavery. To support our assumption that civil-
law and common-law preferences for judicial independence could plausibly have 
persisted for long periods of time, we provide evidence that the political culture in state 
legislatures was persistent during the twentieth century.  
                                                 
3 Despite the fact that only one of the thirteen states continues to have a civil-law legal system, we will, for 
convenience, refer to states that initially had civil law as civil-law states.    4
  Our paper is closely related to Hansen (2004b), who argues that state legislatures 
optimally set the level of judicial independence by choosing retention methods for their 
judges. Drawing on Landes and Posner (1975) and Ramseyer (1994), Hanssen argues 
both theoretically and empirically that state legislatures will eliminate retention elections 
and effectively strengthen judicial independence in periods when within-state political 
competition is sufficiently strong.  In practice, however, retention procedures rarely 
change, in part because state constitutions often have to be amended or replaced. 
Moreover, change appears to have been largely driven by the lobbying efforts of outside 
actors such as the American Bar Association and the League of Women Voters and not 
by the legislatures themselves.  
  In contrast to changes in judicial retention, legislatures determine judicial budgets 
annually.
4 The judicial budget is much less closely scrutinized than other more salient 
issues such as the education budget or the passage of high-profile laws. We argue that the 
way in which state legislatures set judicial budgets after the removal of elections is, in 
fact, indicative of preferences within state legislatures for a more or less independent 
judiciary. 
  The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we provide 
background information on legal origins in the American states and on the role of judges 
in common-law and civil-law legal systems.  In section 3, we build a model of how 
common-law and civil-law legislatures set budgets. In section 4, we take the model’s 
predictions to the data. In section 5, we examine the likely mechanism through which 
civil-law norms may have persisted. In section 6, we conclude. 
                                                 
4 In effect, we are arguing that judicial selection and retention procedures are slow moving, while judicial 
budgeting is relatively fast moving. For more on fast-moving and slow-moving institutions, see Roland 
(2004)..   5
2.  Initial Legal Conditions 
  In the next section, we present a model in which differences in state legislatures’ 
preferences regarding the independence of the judiciary lead to differences in outcomes.  
In this section we lay the foundation for the model by presenting evidence to justify two 
key assumptions in the model.  The first is that American states had different legal initial 
conditions, namely whether they were initially settled by a common-law or a civil-law 
country.  The second is that civil-law and common-law legal systems differ in their views 
regarding the appropriate degree of judicial independence. We present evidence that 
common-law legal systems are designed to have, and empirically have, more independent 
judges than civil-law systems. We show that this is consistent with how judges in civil 
and common-law states within the United States have been selected.  
Common and Civil-law Legal Systems in the United States 
  From the time of Christopher Columbus’s arrival in North America in 1492, 
European powers vied for footholds. By the end of the seventeenth century, England had 
acquired control of the Dutch and Swedish settlements in the mid-Atlantic, consolidating 
their control of a large stretch of the Atlantic seaboard.  The eighteenth century was 
marked by British conflict with the Spanish to the South and the French to the North and 
West of the British colonies.  By the late eighteenth century, the French were largely 
absent from North America.  And the Spanish were located largely in Florida, parts of the 
Gulf coast, and territory west of the Mississippi River.   
  With the War of American Independence and the Treaty of Paris in 1783, the newly 
founded United States came to control many of the British possessions in North America. 
In 1803 large amounts of land that had been recently controlled in most cases by both the   6
French and the Spanish came into United States possession through the Louisiana 
Purchase.  Additional land was added by the purchase of Florida in 1821.  In the far 
West, Russia established short-lived settlements in California at Fort Ross and later in 
Washington and Oregon.  Ongoing American settlement in British-controlled Oregon and 
Washington and the election of James Polk (an expansionist, whose slogan was "Fifty-
four Forty or Fight!") led to the Treaty of Washington in 1846.  Conflict with Mexico in 
Texas and elsewhere led to war and the acquisition of additional territory through the 
Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo in 1848.  The final territory in the continental United States 
was acquired through the Gadsden Purchase in 1853.   
  Many states had settlements by civil-law countries at some point during their history.  
When classifying states as civil or common-law, however, we will restrict attention to the 
states that have evidence of permanent settlement and operation of a civil-law legal 
system during the eighteenth century.  In Berkowitz and Clay (2006), we use population 
estimates, later census data, land claims, and evidence on the operation of courts to 
classify states as having originally had a civil or common-law legal system. Based on this 
evidence, we define thirteen states –Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Florida, 
Illinois, Indiana, Louisiana, Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri, New Mexico, and Texas – 
as civil-law states.  The remaining thirty-five states in the continental United States are 
classified as common-law states. 
  For our purposes, it is important to note that by the mid-eighteenth century, a legal 
system based on English common-law was operating in the English colonies: lawyers 
pled cases before judges, there was trial by jury, judges adjudicated based on precedent 
and English common-law was influential in substantive laws including real estate,   7
inheritances, marriage and divorce, separation of Church and State, criminal law and in 
procedures (Hoffer, 1992).    
  Similarly civil-law legal systems were operating in the Spanish, French, and Mexican 
colonies.  Civil procedures were in use and parts of the law had been codified.  Further, 
book-length legal histories of Arkansas, California, Florida, Missouri, Louisiana, New 
Mexico, and Texas, and articles about Alabama and Mississippi indicate that colonial 
judges served that same basic function as they did in the home country. In Illinois, 
Indiana, and Michigan, records from the village assemblies, which governed many 
aspects of village life, and records of disputes that made it to New Orleans, which was the 
administrative center for France and later Spain, suggest there was something 
approaching a formal judicial system in these three states.
5   
Civil and Common-law Attitudes towards Courts 
  As noted by Merrryman (1985), judges play very different roles in common and civil-
law legal systems. In civil-law legal systems, the judiciary is considered to be primarily 
an enforcement arm of the state, whereas in common-law legal systems the judiciary 
protects citizens from the state.  In particular, common-law judges check the power of the 
executive and legislative branches of the state. In civil-law legal systems judges primarily 
interpret existing statutes, while in common-law legal systems judges can create law 
within the system of precedents. Thus, if civil-law and common-law attitudes towards the 
judiciary persist, we should observe a less independent judiciary in civil-law states.  
La Porta et al (2004) provide detailed cross country evidence that judges are less 
independent in civil-law countries than in common-law countries for two reasons. First, 
they find that the tenure of Supreme Court judges and administrative judges is longer in 
                                                 
5 On French Illinois, see Ekberg (1998) and Briggs (1990).   8
English common-law countries than in French civil-law countries. Judges with relatively 
long tenures are less vulnerable to political pressure. Second, La Porta et al (2004) 
provide evidence that judicial decisions are more likely to become a source of law in 
English common-law countries than in French civil-law countries. Judges who are bound 
by judicial precedent are less likely to be influenced by the executive and legislative 
branches when ruling in particular cases. Mahoney (2001) argues that high-level 
common-law judges tend to be more effective in checking the executive branch, because 
they have a strong exit option. The typical high-level common-law judge was an 
independent and powerful lawyer before becoming a judge, while the typical high-level 
civil-law judge spent his or her prior career advancing through the civil service.   
  In related work (Berkowitz and Clay 2006), we document that state judges in the 
American civil-law states are less independent than state judges in common-law states at 
the end of the twentieth century. Of the methods of judicial retention, partisan elections 
now are widely considered to give officials in the state legislative and executive branches 
the most leverage over judges. Controlling for membership in the Confederacy, civil-law 
states were more likely to retain their high-court state judges through partisan elections.  
Further, civil-law states provide smaller budgets to their judges, remove their judges 
more frequently, and amend and replace their constitutions more frequently.  
  Because partisan retention elections are considered to be one of the most significant 
impediments to judicial independence, it is useful to review how common and civil-law 
states have employed this procedure throughout the twentieth century.
6 Partisan elections 
were originally widely adopted in the nineteenth century in response to the perception 
                                                 
6  We focus on retention because this appears to have a stronger influence than selection on how judges 
rule: for example, see Berkowitz, Bonneau and Clay (2006) and Besley and Payne (2003). However, most 
states have similar retention and selection procedures.    9
that state legislatures had too much – and common people had too little – control over the 
judiciary.  Beginning in the early twentieth century, states began to move away from 
partisan elections as their negative effects became apparent. Figure 1 illustrates that 
during 1910-2000 partisan retention elections for court of last resort judges have been 
replaced by other methods. During 1910-1959, 20 states eliminated partisan retention 
elections. During 1960-2000, 15 more states followed. Moreover, controlling for 
membership in the Confederacy, civil-law states were much slower to remove partisan 
retention elections than common-law states.
7  That is, Civil-North states were slower to 
remove partisan retention elections than Common-North states, and Civil-South states 
were slower to remove partisan retention elections than Common-South states.  
  Why have civil-law states been slower to remove partisan retention elections? 
Hanssen (2004b) argues that retention elections were removed during periods of intense 
within-state political competition. His interpretation is that the dominant political party 
chose to commit to an independent judiciary to preserve their legislative policies when 
faced with the real possibility of losing control of the state legislature.  If this is correct, 
civil-law states should have had lower levels of political competition.  
In fact, civil-law states have had lower levels of political competition. To measure 
political competition, we use a version of the Ranney index that captures the extent to 
which either the Democratic or Republican Party dominates the upper and lower houses 
of the state legislatures.
8 This Ranney index is computed as the minus the product of the 
                                                 
7 The data on dates of changes are drawn from Hanssen (2004a) and individual state constitutions.  The 
latter are available at http://www.stateconstitutions.umd.edu/index.aspx. The way in which states select 
their high-court judges tends to be indicative of how they select their lower courts judges: see Berkowitz, 
Bonneau and Clay (2006) for evidence on trial judges and Hanssen (2004a) for evidence on appellate 
judges.  
8 The measure is computed as the minus the product of the absolute values of the share of Democrats in the 
upper house minus 0.5 times the share of Democrats in the lower house. See Besley and Case (2003).  This   10
absolute values of the share of Democrats in the upper house minus 0.5 times the share of 
Democrats in the lower house. If, for example, the Democrats held 90 percent of the seats 
in the upper and lower houses, the Ranney index then equals: 
16 . 0 ) 5 . 0 9 . 0 ( * ) 5 . 0 9 . 0 ( − = − − −abs . The Ranney index can vary from -0.25 to 0 and 
higher values imply more competition.  During 1953-2000 the Ranney index was -0.080 
in civil-law states and -0.041 in common-law states. We reject the null that this difference 
is zero at the 1-percent level. 
  Another explanation is that legislatures in civil-law and common-law states have 
different preferences regarding judicial independence. Specifically, if the civil-law 
preferences for a weak judiciary were preserved long after common-law replaced civil 
law in the American states, then we would expect legislatures in civil-law states would be 
more likely to withstand attempts to move from elections to appointment than legislatures 
in common-law states.
9 Figure 1 is consistent with this interpretation. 
  We can reconcile these two views using a simple econometric model. Let judicial 
independence equal 0 when there are partisan elections, and equal 1 otherwise. We 
estimate the probability of judicial independence in state s (prob(refs(t) = 1) in year t 
using a standard probit model. 
Columns (1) and (2) in Table 1 verify Hanssen’s theory: political competition is 
positively associated with judicial independence at the 1-percent level controlling for 
national time effects. When we also control for population and real per capita income 
(2000 is the base year), the coefficient on political competition remains positive. It 
                                                                                                                                                 
measure is highly correlated during 1970-90 with the traditional Ranney index that includes the state 
executive branch. 
9 Again, the exception is Louisiana. However, Fernandez (2001) argues that shortly after Louisiana entered 
the Union judges in Louisiana had the power to rule based on precedents and to create precedents.   11
shrinks, however, to roughly one-fifth its original size, and its significance falls to the 10-
percent level.  
In columns (3) and (4) we also test for whether political competition has the same 
association with judicial independence in civil-law and common-law states. We include 
political competition interacted with civil-law as an explanatory variable and test the null 
that this interaction variable is insignificant. In specification (3) we control for national 
time effects and differential time effects in civil-law states. We reject that null at the 1-
percent level. In specification (4) we also control for real per capita income and 
population again allowing for differential effects in civil-law states. We reject the null at 
the 5-percent level.  
 Thus, common and civil-law state legislatures behave differently in the sense that 
they change judicial selection and retention procedures under different conditions. 
Common-law legislatures do not need high levels of political competition to remove 
elections. Civil-law legislatures, on the other hand, tend to eliminate elections in periods 
when political competition is intense. There is evidence that agitation for changes in 
judicial selection and retention almost invariably come from parties outside the state 
legislature, including the American Bar Association, the League of Women Voters and 
informed citizens (see American Bar Association, 2003; Becker and Reddick, 2003; and 
Hanssen, 2004a). Thus, it is likely that these groups are successful in civil-law states 
precisely when the dominant political party is vulnerable. In contrast, these groups are 
successful in common-law states, even in periods when the level of political competition 
is not unusually high. This is consistent with common-law legislatures preferring a more 
independent judiciary.       12
  The theory that we develop in the next section posits that state legislatures differ in 
their preferences for independence because of their legal initial conditions.  Because there 
are many actors involved in setting judicial selection and retention policy, in any year 
state legislatures take retention policy as given. The way in which legislatures set budgets 
provides an empirical test for the whether common-law and civil-law state legislatures 
differ in their preferences.  
 
3.  The Model 
In this section we model a three-stage game in which common and civil-law 
legislatures different in their preferences regarding judicial independence. Legislatures 
first choose a judicial appointment system, then legislatures choose judicial budgets and 
then judges make rulings. In practice, the first period is plausibly exogenous since, as we 
have previously argued, it is hard for legislatures to change retention procedures. 
We extend the model developed by Maskin and Tirole (2004). There are two periods, 
denoted t = 1 and 2 and, in each period, a judge can take one of two possible actions 
(rulings), which we denote r = a, b.  These actions, while carrying the same labels for 
notational convenience, are almost certainly different in the two periods. 
  In each period, there is a socially efficient ruling, which may be a or b. The 
probability that the socially efficient ruling is the popular ruling a is p > 0.5.  The value 
of  p is common knowledge among the electorate. Moreover, it is what the electorate 
would choose if they were collectively the judge.  Therefore, the ruling a is always the 
most popular ruling. If b is the socially efficient ruling and the judge rules for b, the   13
ruling will be unpopular. The variable p is exogenous and is a proxy for how well 
informed the populace is about a particular legal issue.   
 Let  c ≥ 0 denote the costs that a judge needs to incur to find out whether ruling a or 
ruling b is efficient in any period. In the model, c is exogenously determined, but judges 
will make endogenous decisions about whether to become informed. If the judge incurs 
costs c, we will call her ruling informed. Loosely speaking, c can be thought of as costs 
associated with research inputs, such as the number and quality of judicial clerks and 
research related staffs, any costs of accessing research related materials, and any other 
support costs such as computers related to judicial clerks and research related staffs. 
These resources exceed the normal level of resources supplied by the legislature to cover 
salaries and capital budgets.
10  Further, judges do not fund these resources with their own 
money or with money raised from political groups. Another way of thinking about c is as 
the additional resources judges need to make a careful decision. Without these resources 
judges will remain uninformed.  
  The probability that a judge is congruent, that is, prefers that efficient ruling when she 
is fully informed is π.  The selection process is better than random: π > 0.5. The 
probability that a judge is incongruent is 1-π. Thus, π is proxy for the quality of the 
judicial selection process. 
  In Table 2 panel A, we list how a judge’s preferred ruling depends both on whether or 
not she is informed and on the state of nature. The first column contains the judge’s 
preferred choices when she is fully informed. The second column contains the 
corresponding probabilities of these outcomes. The third column contains the judge’s 
                                                 
10 Because the transaction costs for the legislative and judicial branches to negotiate this additional budget 
on a case by case basis are high, we assume that Coasian bargains cannot be made.   14
preferred choices when she is uninformed and the fourth column contains corresponding 
probability of these outcomes. 
  An informed judge prefers ruling a either because a is efficient and the judge is 
congruent, or because ruling b is efficient and the judge is incongruent. Similarly, an 
informed judge prefers ruling b, either because she is incongruent and a is efficient, or 
because she is congruent and b is efficient. If she is congruent and thus public opinion is 
her best source of information, an uninformed judge prefers ruling a. If she is 
incongruent, an uninformed judge prefers ruling b. 
  The legislature sets the judicial budget. Legislatures want to promote social welfare. 
Common-law legislatures, however, prefer a more independent judiciary, while civil-law 
legislatures prefer a less independent judiciary. Moreover, the median citizen in a 
particular state s varies in their willingness to pay for an efficient outcome, denoted v
s > 
0, and this variation is driven by state-level fundamentals such as income, education, 
religion, etc. The willingness of the median citizen to pay for the inefficient outcome in 
each state is normalized at 0.  
  To capture the influence of political culture in common and civil-law state 
legislatures, we assume that when an appointed judge makes a socially efficient ruling, 
the common-law legislatures receive payoff,  γ
common v
s > v
s > 0, because this confirms 
their belief in the inherent value of an independent judiciary. And, when an appointed 
judge makes an efficient ruling, the civil-law legislature receive payoff 0 < γ
civilv
 s < v
s, 
because this undermines their beliefs. Thus, γ
common > 1 > γ
civil > 0. Both types of 
legislatures receive a payoff of 0 after an inefficient ruling is made. 
  The legislatures are risk neutral: when judges are appointed, in state s a legislature    15




L and 0 when there are two, one and zero 
efficient rulings over two periods. And, when judges are elected, legislatures receive 
payoffs of 2, 1 and 0 when there are two, one and no efficient rulings over the two 
periods.   
Appointed Judges 
  Following Maskin and Tirole (2004), let G > 0 and 0 denote the judge’s payoff from 
making her preferred and least preferred rulings in the first period. The judge makes her 
most preferred ruling in the second period.  X = δ(G + R)  denotes her payoffs, δ > 0 is 
the discount factor and R ≥ 0 are rents associated with holding office.     
  Because an appointed judge can remain in office both periods, in each period she 
decides either to spend c and make an informed decision, or to not spend c and make the 
popular ruling, a. An informed judge receives payoffs G – c and X - δc, in periods 1 and 
2, and a uninformed (populist) judge receives payoffs pG and X – δ(1-p)G. In each 
period, a judge makes an informed ruling when c is sufficiently low.   
 
Proposition 1: An appointed judge is informed if and only if J
app > c, where 
 J
app ≡ G(1-p) 
The legislature receives payoffs of γ
Lπv
s– c, if the judge makes an informed ruling, or 
γ
Lpv
s, if the judge makes an uninformed ruling. A legislature L is willing to make 
additional payments to their judges to be informed if and only if L
app > c, where 
L
app   ≡ max[γ
Lv
s(π – p), 0 ],  
where Lcom
app/ v
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  Proposition 1 has several implications. First, if π ≤ p so that popular opinion is at least 
as likely on average as an informed and appointed judge to determine the efficient ruling, 
both common-law and civil-law legislatures budget for a populist judiciary.  
  Second, if we assume 
 (A1)  π > p,  
then the legislature can always implement either a populist or informed judiciary.
11  The 
results are summarized in the Table 2b.  Two things are worth noting.  The first thing is 
that the judicial constraint is not binding on the legislature.  If J
app ≤ c, an additional 
budget equal to J
app + ε, where ε is small, coupled with a direct payment of c - J
app - ε  to 
reduce costs also implements an informed judiciary.
12  The second thing is civil-law and 
common-law legislatures would, under some conditions, prefer different information 
structures given the same values of c, π, and p. This arises if v
sγ
common > c/(π – p) > v
sγ
civil. 
In this case, a common-law legislature will provide more total funding to the judiciary 
than a civil-law legislature in state s. 
  Third, in principle, the model has cross-sectional implications, but due to differences 
in the way that budgets are measured and our inability to control for all relevant state-
specific variables, we will ignore these predictions.  In the next sub-section we will show 
how the model can be used to generate testable time-series predictions. 
 
 
                                                 
11 Assumption (A1) captures Hanssen’s (2004a) interpretation of the early twentieth century where it 
became common knowledge that elected judges were populist and appointed judges were likely to be 
competent and responsible. 
12 This is the smallest amount of the social surplus that the legislature must pay to implement an informed 
judiciary. The legislature does not need to share any more of the social surplus since it is essentially writing 
an ex ante contract for the judges.   17
Elected Judges 
  In a system of elections, judges who stand tall, that is, choose their most preferred 
policy may fail to be re-elected. If the electorate makes inferences about the judges based 
on rulings made in the first period, then the posterior probability that a judge is congruent 
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Both of these inequalities for the posterior probabilities hold since p > 0.5. This implies 
that a judge is re-elected if and only if she makes ruling a in period 1.  
  We denote the critical payoff for elected judges   
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 Since  X = δ(G + R) , where δ is the discount factor and R denotes rents from holding 
office in the second period, it is straightforward to show that an appointed judge is more 
willing to become informed: 
   . 0
app elec J J < ≤  
Proposition 2: If  , 0
elec J c < ≤ then a judge stands tall and makes her preferred ruling in 
period 1, and, if re-elected, makes her preferred ruling in period 2;   
if ,
app elec J c J < ≤ then a judge is a partial populist: she makes ruling a in period 1 to 
retain office, and then makes her preferred ruling in period 2;  
if , c J
app ≤  then a judge is a populist and chooses the popular ruling always.   18
Proof: See the appendix. 
 
  The payoffs for either legislature in some state s when the there are stand tall judges, 
partial populist judges and populist judges are v
sπ(1 + π + 2p(1-π)) – 2c, v
s(p + π) – c and  
2v
sp, respectively, and the critical payoffs are 
 L
elec  ≡ ] 0 ), 1 )) 1 ( ( 2 ) 1 ( [ − − + + π π π π p Max    
 
Proposition 3: A legislature in state s prefers a stand tall judiciary when c < L
elec ,  and a 
populist judiciary when L
elec  ≤  c, and never prefers partial populists.  
Proof: See the appendix. 
 
 Suppose  that  L
elec > 0, so that 
 (A2)  0 ) 1 ( 2 ) 1 (
2 > + − − + π π π π p  
Then, both legislatures are willing to pay for a stand-tall judiciary if costs are low 
enough. A legislature sets the budget equal to c  ], , 0 [
elec L c ∈ ∀  and 0 otherwise. 













dc c cf c ) ( ) , ( γ  denote a legislature’s willingness to pay for an appointed 
judge and an elected judge when the upper bound of the distribution of c exceed all 
critical legislative payoffs in each state. 
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Proposition 4: Suppose that (A1) and (A2) hold so that legislatures are willing to pay for 
an informed appointed judiciary and a stand-tall elected judiciary when costs are small. 
Moreover, suppose that we assume: 
(A3) c is uniformly distributed over the interval [0, C’’]:  ] , max[
~ elec app L L C > . 
Then ) , (
i c γ Ω is separable in v and  0 ) 1 , ( < = Ω γ c  and  . / ) , (
i i c γ γ ∂ Ω ∂  This implies: 
   (1) ) , ( ) , ( ; 0 ) , (
common civil civil c c and c γ γ γ Ω < Ω < Ω . 
Proof. See the appendix. 
  
  Equation (1) predicts that civil-law legislatures cut their budgets following the 
removal of judicial elections, and common-law legislatures either make smaller cuts or 
even increase their budgets.  
  To understand this, first suppose that state legislatures are concerned only with social 
welfare (γ = 1). In this case, legislatures will pay more for an elected judiciary that stands 
tall than an appointed judiciary. While both kinds of judges make the efficient ruling with 
probability π in the first period, elections enable voters to replace judges whose rulings 
suggest they are non-congruent (see Maskin and Tirole, 2004, p.1041).  Hence, social 
welfare – and the legislature’s budget allocation – is higher under elections than 
appointments.  
  A common-law preference for judicial independence, γ
common > 1, increases the payoff 
from appointments, and a civil-law preference, γ
civil < 1, lowers the payoff from 
appointments. Thus, civil-law legislatures cut judicial budgets when elections are 
removed; common-law legislature make smaller cuts and may even increase budgets if 
γ
common  >  1 ) 1 ( ) 1 ( 5 .
* * > − + + = π π γ p  (see the Appendix).    20
Our model can also incorporate the well documented finding that elected judges 
often make decisions that are popular and not necessarily efficient. For example, there is 
evidence that elected judges (compared to appointed judges) are lax in enforcing 
constitutional restrictions on deficit finance and lax in calling hearings for public utility 
dispute cases. They are pro-labor in employment discrimination cases, and consider 
public opinion when making rulings in cases involving death penalties (Hall 1995; Bohn 
and Inman 1996; Hanssen 1999; Besley and Payne 2003).  
  Suppose that after the elimination of elections, the probability of that a judge is 
congruent increases to  . 1 , > = η ηπ π where
app Then, the common-law and civil 
preferences, adjusted for this gain in judicial quality, become ηγ
common > 1 and ηγ
civil  < or 
≥ 1. This implies that if η is sufficiently large:  1 ) 1 ( ) 1 ( 5 . > − + + > π π ηγ p
civil , civil-
law legislatures increase budgets when elections are eliminated. Thus, whether or not 
civil-law legislatures cut budgets is an empirical question. However, the theoretical 
prediction that civil-law legislatures give less to their courts than common-law 
legislatures is robust. 
 
4.  Empirical Results on State Judicial Budgets 
  In this section, we test the model’s prediction that civil-law legislatures cut their 
judges’ discretionary budget more than common-law legislatures following the 
elimination of judicial elections. In this section we describe state judicial budgets, we 
explain how this data can be used to capture discretionary budgets for judges, and then 
we test our theory.    21
  Budgets for state courts are recorded in the judicial and legal expenditures category of 
the annual state budget (U.S. Census Bureau, 2001). This variable includes expenditures 
on all state criminal and civil courts and includes salaries for judges, court reporters, 
payments for witness fees, payments to legal departments, general counsels, solicitors, 
and prosecuting and district attorneys. In 1982, this variable began to include payments 
for legal services and public defense.  
  We deflate judicial and legal expenditures using 2000 as the base year and divide 
them by state population. For brevity, deflated judicial and legal expenditures per capita 
are denoted judicial budgets. Between 1961 and 2000 judicial budgets increased in the 
average continental state from $3.53 to $48.31, which represents an annual average 
growth rate of almost 7 percent.  The dispersion in spending across states has been 
relatively stable: in 1961 spending on courts in the top ranked state (Vermont at $13.28) 
was 14.8 times greater than in the lowest ranked state (Michigan at $0.90). In 2000 
spending in the top ranked state (Connecticut at $116.69) was roughly 13.7 times greater 
than in the lowest rank state (Washington at $3.53). There has been some change in the 
rank of state spending as the correlation coefficient for the rank of judicial and legal 
spending in 1961 and 2000 is 0.51. 
We use a differences-in-differences framework to test our theoretical prediction that 
civil-law legislatures cut judicial discretionary budgets more than common-law 
legislatures following the elimination of elections.
13 To consistently estimate the 
differential impact of reform in civil and common-law states, we control for state fixed 
effects and annual national level time effects: 
                                                 
13 We use elections which include partisan and non-partisan retention elections as this matches our model. 
Our results are qualitatively similar if we use only retention elections. See Tables 1 and 2 in the appendix 
for a listing of reform in retention elections and partisan retention elections during 1960-2000.   22
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Controlling for state-fixed effects enables us to net out baseline judicial expenditures that 
are driven by operating expenditures and employment levels in the state court system and 
thus enables us to measure something conceptually similar to the legislature’s allocation 
of discretionary resources to its judges.
14 
In equation (2), the subscripts i and t denote a particular state and a particular year; 
it JUD ln denotes logged judicial budgets and is the dependent variable; Fi  is a vector of 
state fixed effects, yeart is a vector of national level time effects, Xit is a vector of time 
varying state-level observables, refit  dummy variable equal to 0 when judges are elected 
and 1 when they are appointed and  it ε  is an error term. The civil dummy is interacted 
with the variables  , it ref   t year and Xit to test for the differential impact of civil-law. Our 
specification effectively considers a separate group of common-law and civil-law state 
because it allows for differential time effects and differential effects of the time-varying 
state-level observables. All standard errors are corrected for heteroskedasticity and are 
clustered at the state-level. 
The differences-in-differences estimator is 2 α . We test the hypothesis that  2 α = 0 
(i.e. refit*civil has no significant impact): a rejection of the null against the alternative that 
2 α < 0 is consistent with our theory.   
                                                 
14 This econometric approach will not work if state judicial budgets follow a unit root. Fortunately, the 
state-level time series plots are not consistent with unit roots. The typical trajectory starts with an initially 
flat growth rate followed by a switch to a rapid growth trajectory, where the timing of the switch varies 
across states.  We cannot formally test for a unit root, because we have only 20 observations per state. We 
thank Roman Liesenfeld for help with this point.   23
Table 3 reports results from several specifications of equation (6). In specification (1) 
we control for time effects and state fixed effects. Specification (2) is our baseline: here 
we control for several plausible state-level time-varying determinants of judicial budgets 
including logged state population, logged state annual real-per-capita income, whether or 
not a state has an intermediate appellate court and a reform dummy interacted with a six-
year time-trend effect that allows for some acceleration or deceleration in spending for 
six years after the reform.
 15, 16 In each specification we reject the null at the 1-percent 
level that refit x civil is insignificant. Further, the sign of   refit x civil is negative in both 
specifications. This confirms our theoretical prediction that that civil-law legislatures 
spend less than common-law legislatures on their judges after reform.  
Specification (3) is a “horse race” between our theory of civil-law preferences and 
Hanssen’s theory that political competition drives judicial independence. Since judicial 
budgets plausibly measure judicial independence and discretion (Glaeser, Scheinkman 
and Shleifer, 2003) a positive regressor for political competition and a non-negative 
regressor for political competition interacted with civil-law would be consistent with 
Hanssen’s theory. Moreover, Hannsen’s theory would dominate if including political 
competition eliminates the impact of refit x civil and  refit . In specification (3) we include 
political competition by itself and interacted with civil-law in our baseline (2): and, we 
still find that refit x civil remains negative, refit  remains positive, and both are significant 
at the 1-percent level. Moreover, the political competition variables are insignificant. 
                                                 
15 Intermediate appellate courts allow state courts of last resorts to control their dockets. Langer (2002) 
argues that the introduction of intermediate appellate courts is indicative of the level of development of a 
state court system.  
16 We have also experimented with a 12-year trend and obtained similar results   24
Another concern is that a state having been a member of the Confederacy is 
potentially a fundamental determinant of rule of law in the United States (Wahl 1998 and 
Morris 1996). If this is true, our distinction between common-law and civil-law may be 
just picking up the persistent poor treatment of judges in the South. To deal with this 
concern, in specification (4) we add to our baseline specification the South dummy 
interacted with refit, all of the covariates and the national level time effects. Our theory of 
civil-law norms still holds, since refit x civil remains significantly negative at the 1-
percent level. Moreover, it is striking that the differential effect of reform in the South, 
refit x South, is positive and statistically significant at the 1-percent level. This suggests 
the influence of slavery is very different than the influence of civil-law origins. 
Because the baseline specification (2) contains the most controls, it is arguably 
represents the most plausible estimates of the differential impact of civil-law. In this case, 
civil-law states cut their budgets 37 percent more than common-law states following 
reform. Common-law states increase budgets roughly 19 percent and civil-law state cut 
them roughly 18 percent.
17 These seemingly large point estimates are reasonable 
considering the judicial budgets (deflated in 2000 dollars and in per capita terms) 
increased almost 13-fold during 1961-99. During this period, an average state in an 
average year spent $19 per capita on its courts. The sample standard deviation is large 
($19.20) and spending ranges from $0.90 in Mississippi in 1963 to $109.56 in Delaware 
in 1999. If we adjust for this variation, then the average common-law state increases its 
budget by roughly $3.61 and the average civil-law state decreases its budget by $3.42, 
which is 0.19 and 0.18 of the sample standard deviation.  
                                                 
17 The stand-alone estimator of the impact of judicial reform relates to common-law; the sum of the stand-
alone and interacted estimators relates to the civil-law, which is significant at the 1-percent level.   25
Because we use 20 years of data during 1961-99, we must be cautious about drawing 
inferences for two reasons. The dependent variable may be serially correlated, and the 
judicial reform dummy is repeatedly either 0 or 1.
18 Thus, the estimated standard errors 
can be too small so that we could be over-rejecting the null (see Bertrand, Dufflo and 
Mullainathan, 2004). To address this concern, we use only five years of data (1961, 1971, 
1981, 1991 and 1999). Because our sample size is reduced by 75 percent, we lose 
statistical power. Nevertheless, in results reported at the bottom of Table 3 all of the 
estimates of the differential effect of civil-law are negative. In specification (1) where we 
exclude all time-varying state-level covariates except judicial reform, the estimator is not 
statistically significant. In the baseline (2), we reject the null at the 10-percent level. In 
specifications (3) and (4) where we include political competition and the South, we reject 
the null at the 5-percent level.  
  In Table 4 we use the relative judicial budgets (the ratio of the judicial and state 
legislative budgets) as an alternative measure of judicial discretion. Here the argument is 
that when legislatures increase judicial budgets relative to legislative budgets, this picks 
up additional discretionary budget. The average relative judicial budget grew from 2.2 in 
1961 to 6.0 in 1999. We use specifications (1)-(4) from Table 3.
19 In specification (1) refit 
x civil is significant and negative at the 10-percent level. In specifications (2)-(4), it is 
significant and negative at the 1-percent level. Moreover, when we cut the sample size by 
75 percent, refit x civil is always negative. Further, it is significant at the 10-percent-level 
in specifications (2)-(4). When we check for the power of our theory against the political 
competition theory in specification (3), political competition is never significant.  And, 
                                                 
18 It is hard to either confirm or reject serial correlation as there are only 20 observations per state. 
19 These specifications are sensible since the state-level trajectories do not follow a unit root.   26
when we check for the power of the civil-law theory against the South in specification 
(4), refit x south is statistically significant at the 1-percent level and has the opposite sign 
of refit x civil.  
  The point estimates in the baseline specification (2) are striking: following reform 
civil-law states cut the relative judicial budget by 51 percentage points more than 
common-law states In common and civil-law states, there was a 30 percent gain and a 22 
percent loss in the relative budget, respectively. Because the relative judicial budget on 
average is 3.3 with a sample standard deviation of 2.8, the average common-law 
increased it by 34 percent of a sample standard deviation, and the average civil-law state 
decreased it by 26 percent. 
 
5.  Persistence and State Politics 
In the previous section, we presented evidence that civil-law legislatures cut budgets 
more than common-law legislatures when judicial retention were changed from elections 
to appointment. This is consistent with civil and common-law state legislatures having 
different preferences regarding judicial independence. This raises the question: How 
would such preferences have persisted? In this section, we document that both political 
competition and legislative professionalism are quite persistent within state legislatures. 
Since political competition and professionalism are both indicative of a persistent culture 
within state legislatures, state level political culture is a plausible channel for 
transmission of civil and common-law norms. Moreover, our previous discussion in 
section 2 (see Table 1) about the differential response of civil and common-law   27
legislatures to political competition provides additional evidence of this persistent culture 
with state legislatures. 
  Clay (2006) argues that climate at time of colonial settlement was related to the 
development of political competition in state institutions in the antebellum period.
20 The 
idea is that states that had a rainy and warm climate, limited flooding and drought and 
deep soil were highly suited to farming, and the rich farmers used political institutions to 
promote their narrow interests.
21  States that were colder and had less rain, more 
droughts, and more flooding and shallower soil were less well suited for farming. Their 
economic elites were drawn from more diverse occupations and so had less ability to use 
political institutions to promote their narrow interests. Thus, if political competition is 
persistent, we would expect it to be correlated with climate. Clay (2006) also notes that 
legal origin, initial transport and the culture of the settlers may have also plausibly 
influenced the state politics.  
  The top panel in Table 5 reports how political competition in 1910, 1930, 1950, 1970 
and 1990 is influenced by initial conditions.
22 We find that climate is always negatively 
associated with political competition at the 5-percent level. In the bottom panel political 
competition in 1910, 1930, 1950, 1970 and 1990 is regressed on lagged political 
competition and the full set of initial conditions. Lagged political competition is 
positively associated with political competition at the 1-percent level in each 
                                                 
20 Ideally, political competition during the colonial period would be documented. However, sufficient data 
is only available as far back as the antebellum period. 
21 Our climate measures is weighted average of five key variables: climate = 0.8445*std(temperature) + 
0.8232*std(precipitation) – 0.8172*std(flood frequency) + 0.8262*std(depth of soil) – 0.5880*(months of 
drought per decade), where all of the explanatory variables are converted to have mean 0 and variance 1 
and std denotes the standard deviation for a particular state. See Clay (2006) for the details. 
22 In order to avoid measurement errors, political competition is averaged over ten year periods. So, 
political competition in 1990 is the Ranney index averaged during 1980-90.     28
specification and climate is negatively associated at the 5-percent level in two of the 
specifications. Thus, there is strong evidence of persistence in the twentieth century. 
We use the measures of professionalism in state legislatures developed by Squire 
(2006a, 2006b) for additional evidence of persistence. The Squire index compares the 
average pay, average staff size and average number of days in sessions of a member of a 
state legislative body with his/her counterpart in the  United States Congress. “In essence, 
the measure shows how closely a legislature approximates these characteristics of 
Congress on a scale where 1.0 represents perfect resemblance and 0.0 represents no 
resemblance” (Squire 2006b, p.4). When the Squire index is close to 0.0, members of 
state legislators have relatively low and small staffs and they meet relatively infrequently. 
This can be associated with a culture where legislators are pressed to find alternative 
income sources and where they are poorly informed about technical aspects of issues. 
The top panel of Table 6 reports conditional associations between the Squire index 
during 1935, 1945, 1960, 1979, 1996 and 2003 and initial conditions.
23 The evidence here 
is somewhat weaker: traditional culture (Elazar T) is negatively associated with the 
Squire index in all specifications. It is significant at the 10-percent level in three. 
Transport is positively associated with the Squire index and significant at the 10-percent 
level in only three. The evidence for persistence is stronger when we control for the 
lagged Squire index in the bottom panel. The lagged Squire index is positive and 
statistically significant at the 1-percent level in each reported year except for 1935. Other 
variables associated with initial conditions are no longer consistently statistically 
significant. Further, the lagged Squire index dramatically increases the fit of each 
                                                 
23 The index is available during various years between 1910 and 2003. Because we use lags to test for 
persistence, we start with explaining political professionalism in 1935 which is the second earliest year for 
which the index is available.   29
regression: for example, the R-square without and with lagging is 0.281 and 0.764 in 
1945, and 0.243 and 0.910 in 2003. Thus, professionalism in state legislatures was 
persistent, at least during 1935-2003.  
 
6.  Conclusion 
There is a growing body of evidence that initial conditions such as climate, latitude, 
early disease environment, legal family and the process of legal transplantation have a 
persistent and long term effect on the quality of institutions around the world. Just how 
these initial conditions have left their imprint after many decades and even centuries is 
difficult to document and, therefore, challenging to explain. In this paper, we build on the 
finding that the establishment of civil-law systems by French, Mexican and Spanish 
explorers in North America during the seventeenth, eighteenth and nineteenth centuries 
has left its imprint on courts in the American states at the turn of the twenty-first century 
(Berkowitz and Clay, 2005 and 2006). States that have civil-law origins have less 
independent judges and lower quality courts than states with common-law origins. This 
pattern is consistent with the treatment of judges in civil-law and common-law countries 
around the world (La Porta et al, 2004 and Mahoney, 2001). Our major finding is that 
when setting the judicial budget, civil and common-law state legislatures behave in ways 
that are consistent with their having different preferences regarding judicial 
independence. We have also documented that the political culture in state legislatures has 
been slow-moving during much of the twentieth century, so that is plausible to posit 
stable state-legislative preferences.   30
It is clear from many studies including North (1990) that courts run by an 
independent judiciary are one of the central economic institutions that protect property 
rights and enforce contracts. Our work shows that initial legal families have had a 
persistent and long term influence on courts in the United States. It also identifies 
channels through which initial condition influence contemporary institutions. By better 
understanding these channels, policy makers can then design policies that overcome the 






































civil south common south civil north common north  32
Table 1: Dependent Variable is a Judicial Independence, 1953-2000 
 (1 = no partisan elections, 0 = partisan elections) 
 
Specification (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Ranney index   8.89***   
(0.704) 
 
1.83*   
(1.06) 
5.30   
(1.02) 
-2.14   
(1.52) 
Ranney x Civil 
 
    7.36***   
(1.78) 




-442.04 -337.38  -402.71  -300.33 
Pseudo R
2  0.213 0.399  0.283  0.465 
Civil-law 
 
No No  Yes  Yes 
National  
time effects  
Yes Yes  Yes  Yes 
National  
time effects x Civil-
law 
No No  Yes  Yes 
Real per capita 
income and 
population 
No Yes No  Yes 
Both real per capita 
income and 
population  x Civil-
law 
No No  Yes  Yes 
 
Notes: Estimates are based on probit regressions for all odd years. In the 1950s we have 1953 and 1957 
only; then we report the 20 odd years from 1991 through 1999.  The estimate of the constant is not 
reported. The notation ***, ** and * denotes significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent and 10 percent levels. 
There are always 1025 observations: we drop Nebraska because it has one legislative house so we cannot 
measure political competition there and there are nine years when political competition is not reported in 
Minnesota.  Since we have 22 years, 47 states and nine missing observations, then 47*22 – 9 = 1,025.   33
 











a is efficient; 
judge prefers a 
P π 
b is efficient; 
judge prefer a  
(1-p)(1-π) 
It is not known 
with certainty 
what is efficient; 
judge prefers a 
 Π 
a is efficient; 
judge prefers b 
P (1 – π) 
b is efficient; 
judge prefers b 
(1-p) π 
It is not known 
with certainty 
what is efficient; 
judge prefers b 
(1- π) 
  
Table 2B: Legislatures and Implementation of Judicial Policy 
 L civ
app   ≤ c  Lciv
app  > c  Lcom
app   ≤ c  Lcom
app  > c 
J
app > c  Populist Informed  Populist Informed 
J
app ≤ c  Populist   Informed  Populist   Informed   34
 Table 3: Judicial Budgets and Judicial Reform 
 
Specification  (1)  (2) (3) (4) 
  Dependent variable is log judicial and legal expenditures, for 
every odd year during 1961-99 


















   -0.059 
(0.379) 
 
Political Competition x 
Civil 
   0.090 
(0.641) 
 
Judicial reform x South 
 
     0.394*** 
(0.120) 
Controls; state fixed 
effects; national time 
effects, national time 









Additional Controls; real 
income, population, 
intermediate appellate 
courts, 6 year time trend 











Variables interacted with 
the South:  real income, 
population, intermediate 
app. courts, 6 year trend  
No No  No  Yes 
Adjusted R
2  0.894  0.904 0.905 0.904 
Observations 960  960  933  960 
  Robustness check: Sample limited to  
1961, 1971, 1981, 1991 and 1991 










   0.310 
(0.751) 
 
Political Competition x 
Civil 
   -1.40 
(1.28) 
 
Judicial reform x South 
 
     0.561** 
(0.251) 
Notes: Standard errors are heteroskedasticity corrected, and ***, ** and * denotes significance at the 1-
percent, 5-percent and 10-percent levels. In 1961 eleven of the thirteen civil-law states and twenty-three of 
the common-law states had retention elections. By 1999, five of the civil-law states and ten of the common-
law states had eliminated elections. Moreover, Tennessee (a common-law state) had elections appointments 
n 1961, reinstated elections in 1966 and removed them again in 1995. We obtain qualitatively similar 
results when we use partisan retention elections.  35
Table 4: Relative Judicial Budgets and Judicial Reform 
 
Specification (1) (2)  (3) (4) 
  Dependent variable is log judicial power, for every odd year 
during 1961-99 























Political Competition x 
Civil 
   -0.317 
(0.844) 
 
Judicial reform x South 
 
     0.624*** 
(0.181) 
Controls; state fixed 
effects; national time 
effects, national time 









Additional Controls; real 
income, population, 
intermediate appellate 
courts, 6 year time trend 











Variables interacted with 
the South:  real income, 
population, intermediate 
app. courts, 6 year trend  
No No  No Yes 
Adjusted R
2  0.633 0.653  0.660 0.653 
Observations  960 960  933 960 
  Robustness check: Sample limited to  
1961, 1971, 1981, 1991 and 1991 










   -0.136 
(1.43) 
 
Political Competition x 
Civil 
   -1.04 
(1.88) 
 
Judicial reform x South 
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Table 5: Political Competition 
 
Dependent Variable is the Modified Ranney Index 
 
  1910 1930 1950 1970 1990 



















































Obs  48 48 47 46  47 
R-squared  0.490 0.457 0.664 0.782  0.485 
  1910 1930 1950 1970 1990 































































Obs  40 48 47 46  46 
R-squared  0.709 0.764 0.747 0.831  0.693 
 
 
Notes: The notation ***, ** and * denotes significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent and 10 percent levels; 
standard errors are corrected for heteroskedasticity. The modified Ranney index is averaged over ten years, 
so in 1990, for example, it is the average for each state during 1980 through 1990. The top panel includes 
initial conditions and the bottom panel also includes the lagged dependent variable, where 1970 is the lag 
for 1990; 1950 is the lag for 1970; 1930 is the lag for 1950, 1910 is the lag for 1930 and 1890 is the lag for 
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Table 6: Legislative Professionalism 
 
Dependent Variable is Squire’s Legislative Professionalism Index 
 
  1935 1945 1960 1979 1996 2003 

































































Obs 35 48  48 48 48 48 
R-squared  0.246 0.281  0.287 0.213 0.345 0.243 
  1935 1945 1960 1979 1996 2003 













































































Obs 35 48  48 48 48 48 
R-squared  0.068 0.764  0.678 0.611 0.812 0.910 
 
Notes: The notation ***, ** and * denotes significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent and 10 percent levels; 
standard errors are corrected for heteroskedasticity.  The top panel includes initial conditions and the 
bottom panel also includes the lagged dependent variable, where 1996 is the lag for 2003; 1979 is the lag 
for 1996; 1960 is the lag for 1979; 1945 is the lag for 1960; 1935 is the lag for 1945; and 1910 is the lag for 
1934. We do not report estimates for the constant term. Data on legislative professionalism is taken from 
Squire (2006a, 2006b).   38
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Appendix 
 
Table 1A: Retention of Court of Last Resort by Elections: 1960-2000 










New Mexico  1989 
New York  1979 
Oklahoma 1968 
Pennsylvania 1968 






Table 1B: Retention by Partisan Elections: 1960-2000 










New Mexico  1989 
New York  1979 
Oklahoma 1968 
Pennsylvania 1968 
South Dakota  1981 
Tennessee* 1995 
Sources: The Book of the States, various years and Hanssen (2004a)  
*Tennessee appoints as of 1960, introduces partisan elections in 1966 and 
then removes partisan elections in 1995; all other states remove elections once 
and for all during 1960-2000.   42
Appendix-Proofs 
Proposition 1 Proof: An informed judge receives pay-offs G – c and X – δc in periods 1 
and 2; and, an uninformed judge receives pay-offs pG  and X – δ(1-p)G. Then, in each 
period the judges are indifferent to being informed and uninformed when G – c = pG, 
and X – δc = X – δ(1-p)G, so that J
app ≡ G(1 – p) = c and an appointed judges is 
informed ↔  J
app >  c.  
  The legislature in state s is indifferent between an informed and uninformed judge 
when γ
Lπv




s(π – p) = c. Since, however, c is non-negative then the 
legislature is willing to make additional payments for an informed judge ↔ L
app   ≡ 
max[γ
Lv
s(π – p), 0 ] > c.  
  Since  L








Proposition 2 Proof:  In the second period, the judge does not worry about re-election 
and so is informed ↔  J
app >  c.  If G ≥ X ≡ δ(G + R), then a judge is never willing to 
stand-tall, and will always choose the popular position in the first period.  
 
Suppose G > X. In the second period, the judge does not worry about re-election and so is 
informed ↔  J
app >  c. Therefore, the judge is uninformed ↔ J
app ≤  c.  
 
Consider the first period. If the judge is congruent and chooses to stand-tall, then she 
receives first period pay-off G – c and is re-elected with probability p and the total pay-
off from standing tall is G – c + p(X – δc). If the judge is a partial populist and makes the 
uninformed (and popular) ruling in the first period, her total pay-off is    43
pG + X – δc. Therefore, a judge is indifferent between standing tall and partial populism 
when c = 
) 1 ( 1
















) 1 ( 1







, Proposition 2 holds for the congruent 
judge. It is trivial to show this argument applies to the non-congruent judge. 
 
Proposition 3 Proof:  Let L(ST), L(PP) and L(POP) denote the a legislature’s pay-off 
from a stand-tall, partial populist and populist judge. Note that we draw no distinction 
between common and civil-law legislatures, because they have the same pay-offs when 
there are elections (for simplicity, pay-offs are different for civil and common legislatures 
under appointments).  
  If a judge stands tall, she makes the socially efficient decision with probability π in the 
first period and welfare is π - c. Elected judges rule efficiently in the second period in 
three possible states of nature. First, with probability πp the first term judge is congruent 
and is re-elected; second, with probability π(1-p)π = π
2(1-p) the first term judge is 
congruent, is voted out office, and is replaced with another congruent judge; and, third, 
with probability (1-π)pπ, the first term judge is incongruent, voted out of office and 
replaced with a congruent judge. Moreover, in the second term, if an incongruent judge 
emerges, she will still be informed. Therefore, in the second term welfare is  
π(p + (1-p)π + (1-π)p) – c  =  π(π + 2p(1-π)) – c. The legislature’s two-period pay-off is: 
} 2 ) ) ) 1 ( 2 1 ( { ) ( c p v ST L
s − + − + = π π π  
  Under partial populism, the probability of an efficient ruling in the first period is p 
(and the judges is uninformed) and in the second period is π, and    44
) ( ) ( c p v PP L
s − + = π  
  Under populism, the judge is always uninformed and the probability of an 
efficient ruling is p in each period, so that  
) 2 ( ) ( p v POP L
s =  
  The proof is completed in two steps. Step 1 shows if L(PP) > L(POP), then 
standing tall dominates: L(ST) > L(PP) > L(POP). Step 2 shows if L(POP) ≥ L(PP), then 
L(ST) dominates when c < L
elec, and L(POP) dominates when c ≥ L
elec. 
  Step 1: By simple manipulation:  
(i) If L(PP) - L(POP) > 0 → . 0 > − − c p π  
Moreover,  
(ii) L(ST) – L(PP) =  c p p p − − + −
2 2 2 2 π π π  
Therefore, 
(iii) sgn L(ST) – L(PP) =  . } 2 2 { sgn
2 2 c p p p − − + − π π π  
Note that: 
5 . 0
: sin , ) 1 ( ) 1 ( 2
: sin






ce holds which p
rewritten be can this ce
p p iv
π π π π
π π π π
 
Therefore, if L(PP) – L(POP) so that  , 0 > − − c p π  the equation (iv) implies that 
sgn L(ST) – L(PP) > 0. 
 
Step 2: Suppose L(POP) ) ≥ L(PP). Then, 
(i)  . 0 ≤ − − c p π  
Therefore,   45
(ii) sgn L(ST) – L(POP) =  c p − − − + + )} 1 ) 1 ( ( 2 ) 1 ( { 5 . 0 sgn π π π π  
By inspection, sgn L(ST) – L(POP) is decreasing in c, and the sgn is 0 when  
. )} 1 ) 1 ( ( 2 ) 1 ( { 5 . 0 c p = − − + + π π π π   
Define    L
elec  ≡ ] 0 ), 1 )) 1 ( ( 2 ) 1 ( [ − − + + π π π π p Max .  
It follows that the legislature in state s prefers a stand tall judiciary when c < L
elec ,  
and a populist judiciary when L
elec  ≤  c. Moreover, the legislature never 
implements a partial populist judiciary. 
 






dc c cf c γ then we can exploit the 
properties of the uniform distribution in assumption (A3): 
(i)    ) ) ( ) ( )( " 2 / ) (( ) , (
2 2 2 elec app s i L L C v c − = Ω γ  
Plugging in for L
app and L
elec, and recalling that by (A2) L
elec  > 0, then 
 (ii)  } )) 1 ( 2 1 ( ) ( 4 { ) ' ' 2 ( ) ( ) , (
2 2 1 2 π π γ π γ − + + − = Ω
− p C v c
i s i    
  By inspection of (ii),   ) , (
i c γ Ω is separable in v
s and increasing in
i γ . Moreover, 
when 1 =
i γ  and since p > 0.5, then 
(iii) sgn 0 )) 1 )( 2 1 ( )) 1 ( 2 1 ( ) 1 , ( < − − = − − − = = Ω π π π π π γ p p c  
. Since  then
civil , 1 < γ 0 ) , ( < Ω
civil c γ . Moreover 
  = Ω − Ω ) , ( ) , (
civil civil c c γ γ  
  0 } ) ( ) {( ) ' ' ( ) ( 2 ) , ( ) , (
2 2 1 2 < − = Ω − Ω
− common civil s common civil C v c c γ γ π γ γ  
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Follow up points to Proposition 4. 
  Using equation (ii) from the proof of Proposition 4 and recalling that p > 0.5, let 
 (iv) 1 ) 1 ( ) 1 ( 5 .
* * > − + + = π π γ p , where 
  0 ) , (
* * = Ω γ c .  
Then 0 ) , ( , 1
* * > Ω > > ∀
common common c γ γ γ , and 
0 ) , ( , 1
* * < Ω < < ∀
common common c γ γ γ . 
  Now, suppose that after the elimination of elections, the probability that a judge is 
congruent increases to  . 1 , > = η ηπ π where
app  It then follows: 
 } )) 1 ( 2 1 ( ) ( 4 { ) ' ' 2 ( ) ( ) , , (
2 2 1 2 π π ηγ π η γ − + + − = Ω
− p C v c
i s i , where 
 ) , , ( η γ
i c Ω is increasing in 
i ηγ , 
  ∀ = Ω 0 ) , , ( η γ
i c 1 ) 1 ( ) 1 ( 5 . ) (
* * > − + + = π π ηγ p , and 
 0 ) , , ( , 1 ) (
* * > Ω > > ∀ η γ ηγ ηγ
i i c , and  
  . 0 ) , , ( , ) (
* * < Ω < ∀ η γ ηγ ηγ
i i c 
 
 
 